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The E¤ects of State Aid on Total Factor Productivity Growth
Patrick Van Cayseele, Jozef Konings, and Ilona Sergant
KULeuven
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between state aid and rm performance in terms of
productivity growth. To this end, we use all European state aid cases that were granted (either to
an individual rm or a group of rms under the form of a scheme) in manufacturing between 2003
and 2011. Our ndings show that state aid measures are able to enhance productivity growth
when rms are constraint due to a lack of cash availability. Since laggard rms are more likely
to be nancially constraint, they experience more TFP growth than close-to-frontierrms when
receiving state aid. This benecial e¤ect of state aid is mainly driven by the post-crisis years in
the sample. Our results are consistent with optimal development planning by prot maximizing
rms.
1 Introduction
The State Aid Action Plan that was launched by the European Commission (EC) on the 7th of June
in 2005, was meant to pursue less and better targeted state aid in line with the Lisbon Strategy
goal to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. State aid policy can
contribute to enhancing growth and innovation by designing it in such a way to sustain competitive
markets and by improving the functioning of some markets, it may improve on competitive dynamics
and thereby inducing economic growth (Kleiner, 2005).
While state aid in general is prohibited, Article 107 of the Treaty points out a number of excep-
tions, which allows governments to intervene in the market, by e.g. providing subsidies, under strict
conditions. The EC evaluates these by using a balancing testwhich checks, using various criteria, to
what extent the potential positive e¤ects outweigh the negative e¤ect due to the distortion of compe-
tition inicted by the state aid. However, with the break-out of the nancial crisis the criteria under
which state aid could be granted have been relaxed, including the minimum amount that rms can
receive as aid without having to comply with the notication obligation, the so called de minimis
rule1 and hence it is unclear to what extent state aid has continued to be in line with the initial
objectives not to distort competition in the market. From Figure 1 it is also clear that there has been
an exponential increase in the number of state aid cases since in the crisis years, starting in 2007, to
reach a peak in 2009, which conrms a much more lenient attitude of the EC to allow government
intervention and/or indicates an increased demand by the Member States demand to grant state aid.
1See Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1998/2006 of 15 december 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of
the Treaty to de minimis aid, O¢ cial Journal of the European Union, L397/5
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Figure 1: Evolution of the number of state aid cases in Europe
The objective of this paper is to analyze how European state aid has had an impact on rm
performance and in particular on rm productivity growth. By focusing on productivity growth, we
capture the extent to which state aid enables rms to innovate and benet from technological progress,
which has long lasting e¤ects. The channel through which state aid a¤ects rm-level innovation or
productivity growth is through its ability to address market failures. One of the most prevailing market
failures a rm encounters when pursuing a R&D project is the absence of su¢ cient resources to nance
industrial research and development. This coincides with the idea that high competitive pressure can
slow down the innovation process as pointed out by a number of authors in the context of trade and
industrial policy. For instance, in the context of anti-dumping protection Rodrik (1992), Ederington
and McCalman (2008), Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) show when rms are temporarily protected
from international competition, this can induce domestic rms to restructure and accelerate the speed
of adoption of more e¢ cient production technologies. Aghion et al. (2005) show that a reduction
in product market competition reduces the technology gap in an industry. Boone (2000) shows that
the incentive to innovate in such markets is stronger for less e¢ cient rms when they operate under
weak product market competition and hence, laggardrms may be able to catch up with frontier
rms. This idea has been developed through characterization of a rms optimal development plan
by Kamien and Schwartz (1978) and their model will serve as a background to interpret our results.
In particular, for a rm to conduct the necessary investment towards innovation, it must have
access to a source of nancing, either internal through its current prots and accumulated funds, or
external through capital markets. Due to a lack of tangible collateral and less protable prospects
in declining markets, a rm might face a binding cash constraint when it is not able to nance its
projects by its own resources. State aid can then o¤er a solution to this type of market failure by
alleviating the cash constraint faced by a rm so as to enable it to optimize its development path.
Firms pursuing large innovations and new marginal rms are more likely to be constraint by the lack
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of cash availability than established rms performing routineR&D. When a rm faces a binding
cash constraint, government intervention can have a positive impact on innovation, either by hastening
the development pace, and thereby shortening the development period (when there is no innovational
rivalry), or by increasing the acceptability of R&D projects (when innovational rivalry is present).
Figure 2 summarizes this mechanism.
Figure 2: State Aid as a solution to rms cash constraint
Our results conrm this type of mechanism. In particular, we nd state aid to have a positive
e¤ect on total factor productivity growth, especially in markets characterized by high within-sector
competition (or equivalently, lower cash availability through self-nancing). Furthermore, we nd that
this e¤ect is mainly driven by state aid cases granted in the post-crisis years, suggesting that rms are
more likely to experience di¢ culty in nding the necessary resources to nance their R&D projects
while the economy is characterized by a global crisis. When allowing for rm heterogeneity, we nd
that laggardrms benet more from state aid than close-to-frontierrms, which is line with our
theoretical framework, since they are more likely to be cash constraint due to a lack of current prots
and accumulated funds as well as limited access to external nancing.
We start in the next section with a description of the state aid procedure in the European Union.
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In section 3 we introduce the data and our empirical strategy to estimate TFP, using a control function
approach. Section 4 provides the results and in section 5 we show a number of robustness checks,
based on our denitions of cash availability and rm heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 State Aid in the European Union
The legal denition of state aid, provided in Article 107(1) of the Treaty assesses whether a state
measure constitutes "state aid", and thereby establishes jurisdiction:
"Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall,
in so far as it a¤ects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common
market.2"
In general, all measures corresponding to this denition are prohibited with the exception of small
amounts of aid (de minimis aid) which are considered not to have a potential e¤ect on competition
nor trade between member states3 . In practice, distortion of competition is assumed as soon as an
undertaking receives a nancial advantage in a possibly competitive sector4 . However, certain cases
are considered compatible with the common market through one of the exemptions provided for in
article 107(2)5 and 107(3)6 . This enables member states to undertake government intervention in or-
der to address certain objectives. We can distinguish between three types of objectives. Government
interventions can o¤er possible solutions when market outcomes are not in line with societal goals set
by the government as a consequence of market failures. The most important types of market failure
in the eld of state aid are externalities, public goods, market power, and information asymmetries.
Governments might also set strategic economic goals, such as acceleration of growth, innovation ob-
jectives, .... and meta-economic goals, e.g. concerning issues of distribution of wealth among people.
These goals can be categorized as e¢ ciency objectives on the one hand and equity objectives on the
other. Note that a broad set of measures which can also be used to obtain these di¤erent objectives,
are not covered by the notion of state aid. These general measures include nationwide scal measures
2The "common market" has to be interpreted as the European (EU) market.
3De minimis aid is not considered state aid within the meaning of article 107 as long as the total aid granted to
any one undertaking does not exceed EUR 200.000 over any period of three scal years (EUR 100.000 in the road
transport sector), see O¢ cial Journal of the European Union L 379/5. Together with the block exemptions regulations
and Commission guidelines, the de minimis regulation is installed to minimize the administrative burden imposed on
Member States and to ensure a minimum degree of predictability.
4See Communication from the commission (2013), paragraph 188 which states: "For all practical purposes,
a distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU is thus assumed as soon as the State
grants a nancial advantage to an undertaking in a liberilased sector where there is, or could be, competition",
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/draft_guidance_en.pdf
5Article 107(2) stipulates those measures which are automatically considered compatible with the common market.
These include "aid having a social character, granted to individuals; aid to make good the damage caused by natural
disasters or exceptional occurrences; and aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany
a¤ ected by the division of Germany"
6The Commission has a certain discretion in assessing compatibility where the aid "promotes the economic develop-
ment of regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; promotes
the execution of an important project of common European interest; facilitates the development of certain economic
activities; promotes culture and heritage conservation."
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as well as most measures in public education, health care and general infrastructure. These types of
government intervention are usually incorporated within the denition of industrial policy7 , although
state aid and industrial policy are often used interchangeably in the European context8 .
In spite o¤ the possible benets relating to granting state aid, possible negative e¤ects should also
be considered. Such e¤ects can result from several sources. Friederiszick et al. (2007) distinguish
problems which limit the e¤ective use of state aid. The rst is the measurability of the market failure
the government intervention is assumed to address. Since state aid is funded by state resources, there
exists an opportunity cost given that these resources can not be used in other domains of government.
In addition, there might be undesirable side e¤ects of state aid which induces the need to consider the
impact on the functioning of the market. The last most prominent issue concerning state aid, is the
existence of government failures. Following Di Tommaso and Schweitzer (2013), we can distinguish
external from internal sources of government failures. The rst source refers to the mechanism through
which industrial policy objectives, targets, and instruments are dened. Government can be lobbied
resulting in objectives driven by the strongest and best organized pressure group (which is generally
is not the group of consumers). Politicians can also be driven by the desire of maximizing chances to
win elections (Dewatripont and Seabright (2006)) leading to dependence on short-run public opinion.
The internal forces of government failure refer to di¤erence in goals set by bureaucracy and goals of
a planner, in other words, a government might not per se be benevolent. Supranational state aid can
be used to limit these government failures by helping member states to limit ine¢ cient and distortive
aid. The initial motivation of state aid control is to avoid subsidies wars and trade disputes between
member states (Friederiszick et al. (2007)), resulting in wasteful spending by politicians.
In order to asses state aid measures, the Commission uses a balancing test, as rst proposed
by Friederiszick et al. (2007). State aid is declared compatible whenever the positive e¤ects of
the measure by contributing to an objective of common interest, outweigh the negative e¤ects due
to distortion of competition. In line with the goals of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, the European
Commission launched the State Aid Action Planin 2005. This plan consists of a roadmap in order
to consistently reform state aid rules aiming at less and better targeted state aidthrough a rened
economic approach9 . On 8 may 2012, another ambitious reform of the State aid rules has been
launched, known as the EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM). The objectives of this modernisation are
threefold: (i) foster sustainable growth in a competitive internal market, (ii) focusing on the cases
with the largest impact, (iii) streamline the rules and provide for faster decisions.10
In general, state aid is assumed to distort competition and trade within sectors and across countries.
Garcia and Neven (2005) provide a benchmark model to analyze the e¤ects on rivals of state aid. In
general, price distortions are found to be increasing in concentration. When high competition is rather
due to intense rivalry, the magnitude of the distortions depends on the type of state aid intervention.11
7 In the literature however, there is no common denition of industrial policy. E.g. Di Tommaso and Schweitzer
(2013) use the following denition of industrial policy: "IP is the set of all government interventions on production
dynamics driven by national societal goals that are based on a clear understanding of the relationship between goals,
targets and tools. If one starts with a set of normative societal goals, then one can dene specic targets where policy
intervenes, and a variety of possible tools indicating how these IP measures could be implemented."
8 see e.g. Bianchi and Labory (2006)
9 see European Commission, State Aid Action Plan, Less and better targeted aid: a roadmap for state aid reform
2005-2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0107:FIN:EN:PDF
10Par. 8 of the Communication on State Aid Modernisation
11They consider three types of interventions, namely a reduction in marginal cost, an intervention that induces entry
(or prevents exit) and intervention which a¤ects quality
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Their analysis is on a theoretical level, and it therefore is unclear which forces dominate.
Although the Commission targets for less and better aid, considerable amounts of aid are distrib-
uted across the European Union every year. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of non-crisis aid, excluding
railways as percentage of GDP. The amounts of state aid granted is fairly constant over time with
the exception of a strong decrease in aid for Portugal and a recent increase in Finland12 . Given these
vast amounts of funds, it seems appropriate to investigate empirically what the e¤ect of State Aid is
on factor productivity growth.
Figure 3
12For a more elaborate overview on the evolution of state aid, see Bianchi and Labory (2006), and Buiges and Sekkat
(2009)
6
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
Our primary data source is the Amadeus data base, which consists of the income statements of rms
operating in the EU-1513 between 2003-2011. We retrieved operational and nancial information for
all rms active in manufacturing and for which data on value added (output) and on input use, such as
employment and material costs, was available. The coverage across countries varies somewhat, which
is due to di¤erence in the accounting legislation. For instance, in the Netherlands and Germany small
rms are not required to report their income statements, while in Belgium and France, all rms are
required to publish full or abbreviated company accounts14 . To avoid that our results are driven by
outliers in the data, we trim the variables that we use by cutting observations above the 99th and
below the rst percentile of the distribution of the variable of interest. We are left with 278; 676 rms
for our analysis.
The second data source is the European Commission and consists of all state aid cases since
200015 . We can make a distinction between three case types: ad hoc cases, individual applications
and schemes. Ad hoc cases and individual applications are cases for which the individual notication
is requested by the European Commission. An individual application is aid granted on the basis of an
already approved scheme whereas ad hoc cases are unrelated to any scheme. Schemes are measures
of a more general character. Once a scheme has been approved, aid towards undertakings may be
made without needing to notify individually. We only keep the cases which have a clear link to a
region/country and a sector of activity. We are able to match 797 cases to the rm level data over
the period 2003-2011. These include 402 schemes, which gives information on the sector for which the
scheme is applied, and 395 ad hoc and individual cases, which we matched to the specic rms.
Figures 4 & 5 give an overview of total number of cases by respectively Member State and by
sector for all the cases in the period 2000 - 2012, also including those that we could not link to our
rm level data.
Figure 4 Figure 5
13Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
14We loose Denmark, the United Kingdom, Greece and Ireland in our nal dataset due to missing data.
15The case database, available on http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/ is completed with additional informa-
tion, e.g. company names available in the O¢ cial Journal of the European Union.
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In Table 1, we show the summary statistics of the variables that we use to estimate total factor
productivity, as well as the growth rate of TFP, where in the second and third panel we distinguish
between rms that have received state aid and rms that have not.
Table 1: Summary statistics
2003-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Overall
log employment 2.64655 1.186722 2.694917 1.184546 2.615358 1.187079
log tangible xed assets 5.408022 1.943156 5.346335 1.91334 5.447804 1.961116
log material costs 6.467771 1.859848 6.500961 1.812724 6.446366 1.889307
log value added 6.301164 1.444345 6.312251 1.434214 6.294014 1.450798
TFP growth -.0063162 .3443653 .0217431 .3211324 -.0312874 .3619714
AID = 0
log employment 2.624385 1.164422 2.659244 1.16137 2.590693 1.166377
log tangible xed assets 5.305053 1.911876 5.255552 1.88967 5.352898 1.931895
log material costs 6.3404 1.829721 6.39474 1.774433 6.287878 1.880127
log value added 6.221459 1.437381 6.246884 1.41885 6.196885 1.454648
TFP growth -.0055993 .3383845 .02212 .318481 -.0390442 .3580968
AID = 1
log employment 2.669818 1.209253 2.758898 1.222415 2.633843 1.202029
log tangible xed assets 5.516117 1.969678 5.509158 1.944494 5.518927 1.979754
log material costs 6.601482 1.881706 6.691475 1.864352 6.565138 1.887456
log value added 6.384837 1.446905 6.429489 1.454026 6.366804 1.443629
TFP growth -.0072139 .3517108 .0210563 .3259087 -.0242339 .3653168
The average rm employs 14 workers and this remains fairly constant over time, comparing the
averages before and after the crisis. For the entire sample period the average TFP growth is slightly
negative, but there is a clear di¤erence between pre and post crisis years. Before 2007 the average
annual TFP growth is 2.17 percent, while after 2007 TFP growth turned negative, on average -3.1
percent. Interestingly, before the crisis the average TFP growth of rms operating in sectors a¤ected
by state aid is slightly lower than rms in sectors not a¤ected by state aid. However after the crisis
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rms in sectors that receive state aid have a TFP growth, which is almost twice as large (-2.4 percent)
compared to rms that do not receive state aid (-3.9 percent). This suggests that the impact of state
aid in the crisis years has been fundamentally di¤erent than before, so we will exploit this explicitly in
our analysis. Note also that the average employment, value added and tangible xed assets are fairly
similar between the group of rms that receive state aid and the group of rms that do not receive
state aid. The fact that the average characteristics of rms that received state aid are very comparable
to those that do not receive state aid suggests that self-selection or the potential endogeneity of state
aid is not very important.
3.2 Estimation Approach
We use a two step approach to analyze the impact of competition and state aid on productivity
growth. In a rst step we estimate TFP using a control function approach, as rst proposed by
Olley and Pakes (1996) - hereafter OP - and Levin and Petrin (2003) - hereafter LP -, to deal with
the potential endogeneity of the input factors in production. In a second step we then regress TFP
growth on indicators of competition and state aid.
3.2.1 Estimating Total Factor Productivity
Following the standard empirical literature, we assume the rm to produce according to the following
value added Cobb-Douglas production function16 , given by (in logs)
yit = 0 + kkit + llit + !it + it (1)
where yit, kit;and lit denote respectively the logs of value added, capital, and labor of rm i at time
t: The sum of the constant term, 0 and !it captures Hicks-neutral productivity, where !it is referred
to as "unobserved productivity", as it is known to the rm but unobservable to the econometrician.
it is a standard i.i.d. error term incorporating unanticipated shocks and measurement error. To
proxy unobserved productivity, we make use of the rms choices of intermediate inputs (materials)
which is considered a variable nondynamic input. One of the key assumptions of the OP and LP
methodology is that this "unobserved productivity" follows an exogenous rst order Markov process,
given by p

!it+1j f!igt=0 ; Iit

= p (!it+1j!it) where Iit is the rms entire information set at time
t. The goal of the rst stage estimation is to separate !it from it: The rst stage equation is given
by:
yit = t (kit; lit; ;mit) + it (2)
where t (kit; lit;mit) = 0 + kkit + llit + ht (kit; lit;mit) with ht (kit; lit;mit) the inverse material
input demand function17 . Assume the productivity process is given by some function g: The law of
16As pointed out by De Loecker (2013), the approach can also be used to identify more general production functions.
17 If a rms material input demand is given by
mit = mt (!it; lit; kit)
and mt is monotonically increasing in !it; then we can invert this function to obtain
!it = m
 1
t (!it; lit; kit)
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motion can be represented by
!it = g (!it 1) + it (3)
where it is usually interpreted as the innovation in the production process that is unexpected to rms.
This innovation is by construction uncorrelated with kit 1 and lit 1, since both are incorporated in
the information set at time t, Iit:
The second stage involves estimating the following equation:
yjt = lljt + kkjt + eg  t 1   kkjt 1   mmjt 1   lljt 1+ jt + jt (4)
where ljt 1 is used as an instrument for ljt: We follow Wooldrigde (2009) by estimating both stages
at once using GMM. All variables needed are appropriately deated using deators, obtained from
the OECD. We estimate the production function for each sector in each country separately. Table 2
summarizes the obtained average coe¢ cients by sector.
Table 2 : Estimates of the production function
sector description l k
10 Food products 0.702932 0.064131
11 Beverages 0.639899 0.119844
12 Tobacco 0.694182 0.648919
13 Textiles 0.74206 0.041341
14 Wearing Apparel 0.710856 0.067876
15 Leather 0.713055 0.060663
16 Wood 0.744299 0.048459
17 Paper and paper products 0.738571 0.060492
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.78937 0.044718
19 Coke and rened petroleum products 0.426727 0.061877
20 Chemicals and chemical products 0.722585 0.063507
21 Pharmaceutical products 0.681818 0.044375
22 Rubber and plastic products 0.720724 0.056199
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.691757 0.055458
24 Basic metals 0.760559 0.047492
25 Fabricated metal products 0.804088 0.047112
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 0.786203 0.064113
27 Electrical equipment 0.728943 0.051806
28 Machinery and equipment 0.779875 0.043774
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.740443 0.058595
30 Other transport equipment 0.81698 0.056198
31 Furniture 0.739929 0.038024
32 Other manufacturing 0.760292 0.058393
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.885243 0.046971
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3.2.2 Evaluating the e¤ects of state aid
A rm might consider development of a new product in order to enhance future prots, or to protect
itself from potential prot loss when a rivalry product is released. The required funds for these R&D
projects might not be available, in which case, we speak of a rm having a binding cash constraint.
It is clear that a large number of investments, such as "routine" development conducted by (large)
established rms will not su¤er from this lack of cash availability, since they can count on their current
prots and accumulated funds for the nancing of these investment e¤orts or have tangible collateral
to use on the capital markets. However, when rms like to undertake large innovations, the cash
availability might not be su¢ cient in order to follow the optimal development path. In these cases,
the market does not lead to the optimal outcome, and government intervention may o¤er a solution.
State aid, granted to this latter type of rms, can alleviate the binding cash constraint and induce
rms to hasten their development plan or even enable them to pursue otherwise rejected projects.
We expect this e¤ect to be more outspoken in the post-crisis years, since rms will have had more
di¢ culty in nding external funding due to an increased risk aversion by the lenders. Laggardrms
are expected to benet more from state aid than close-to-frontier rms for two distinct reasons:
they have a higher potential growth rate, and they are more likely to experience problems with cash
liquidity due to insu¢ cient collateral to acquire external funding as well as smaller prots for internal
funding.
To put these hypotheses to the test, we need measures of total factor productivity, state aid, cash
constraint and distance to the frontier. Our outcome variable is the total factor productivity growth,
measured at the rm level, denoted by dTFP and dened by
dTFPit = ln (TFPit)  ln (TFPit 1) (5)
where TFPit is estimated using a control function approach, as outlined above.
To measure the intensity of the competition, we compute the price-cost margin (PCM), also known
as the Lerner index. This measure assesses market power within an industry in terms of pricing close
to marginal costs. In addition, it is a good proxy to determine the potential cash constraint, since
high within-sector competition, and thus a lack of market power, and the associated monopoly prots,
are a measure of the rms ability for self-nancing. Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is
0. The Lerner index is computed on country - sector level and is dened as follows:
Lernercjt =
turncjt  materialscjt   wagebillcjt
turncjt
(6)
where turncjt, materialscjt, and wagebillcjt represent the sum of respectively turnover, material costs
and costs of employees of all rms in sector j in country c at time t: The sector level is determined
by the 2 digit level sector according to NACE Rev.2. To facilitate the interpretation of competition
in our regressions, we use the variable Competition which is dened as Competition = 1  Lerner.
To determine whether or not a rm can be considered a laggard, we use the following denition
of its initial distance to the frontier rm:
distancei =
TFPi
maxi2j;j2c(TFPi)
(7)
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where distancei 2 [0; 1] and distancei = 1 for i the most e¢ cient rm in terms of total factor
productivity within the sector-country level in the year 2003. Table 3 provides the summary statistics
for respectively the Lerner index and the distance to the frontier measure.
Table 3 : Lerner index and distance to the frontier by sector
Lerner distance Lerner distance
sector mean st:dev: mean st:dev: sector mean st:dev: mean st:dev:
Total .0806753 .0181941 .0689514 .077595
10 .0653741 .0104211 .0365799 .0416227 22 .0836194 .0128734 .0535895 .0741773
11 .1137235 .020427 .0952782 .0924593 23 .0932374 .0198161 .0703009 .0702026
12 .0957115 .0860097 .1226167 .223631 24 .0754649 .0137362 .0823558 .0829391
13 .0702487 .0119173 .0498968 .0695958 25 .0875876 .0124669 .0660366 .0582866
14 .0648991 .010083 .0741816 .0894123 26 .0872683 .0141921 .1233121 .0986324
15 .0623339 .0126424 .0505291 .0742792 27 .0847989 .0123226 .063204 .0877685
16 .0715799 .0124692 .0977804 .0897869 28 .0824313 .0099504 .050986 .0593868
17 .0815218 .0170461 .1176827 .1096863 29 .0690219 .0170232 .1063967 .1015473
18 .0994184 .0260408 .0827905 .0785129 30 .074633 .0165654 .10907 .1421698
19 .087143 .026835 .3334024 .2751846 31 .0695546 .015826 .0999207 .1043744
20 .0840397 .0112761 .0411989 .0768888 32 .0873673 .0105165 .0656631 .0653706
21 .120836 .0174644 .1489121 .1511593 33 .0734533 .0139611 .0790857 .0573807
We are interested in the overall e¤ect of state aid on rmsproductivity growth. State aid can
only be e¤ective when it relieves a rm from its cash constraint, i.e. when a market failure prevailed
and is resolved by the measure. When this constraint is not binding, state aid will not be able to
enhance productivity growth, since the rm then already follows its optimal development path and
will not alter its investment behavior. Therefore, we expect state aid to positively a¤ect productivity
growth. To establish the existing relationship between productivity growth and state aid, we run the
following regressions:
dTFPit+1 = 0 + 1AIDjct + i + t + "ict (8)
where i and t represent respectively rm and time xed e¤ects. Firm xed e¤ects account for
unobserved rm heterogeneity that is constant over time while time xed e¤ects account for demand
and supply shocks common to all rms. Fixed e¤ects also control for initial di¤erences between TFP.
Typically, rms with low initial TFP are likely to be able to catch up with rms already near the
frontier. Note that if the rms lobbying power to receive state aid, is constant over time, the resulting
self selection problem is taken care o¤ by the rm xed e¤ects. Another way to take into account
this self selection issue, is to include a measure that allows for rm heterogeneity within the sector.
To this end, we include the initial distance to the frontier, dened as above. We expect 1 < 0, or
equivalently that rms operating at low productivity levels grow faster than more e¢ cient rms. In
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addition, rms that are investing in a catching-up process are more likely to encounter a binding cash
constraint, and thereby will benet more from state aid measures which o¤ers them more liquidity
resources to innovate. We estimate the following equation:
dTFPit+1 = 0 + 1AIDjct + 1distancei + 2distancei AIDjct + j + c + t + "ict (9)
where j and c represent respectively sector and country xed e¤ects to account for common shocks
on respectively the sector and country level.
We expect a state aid measure to be more e¤ective, the tighter the cash constraint. When the
within-sector competition is increasing, or equivalently, when pricing is closer to marginal costs, a
rms cash availability decreases and therefore, it nds itself more constraint to follow its optimal
development path. To test this hypothesis, we include competition as well as the interaction term of
competition with the state aid dummy in our regressions:
dTFPit+1 = 0 + 1AIDjct + 1distancei + 2distancei AIDjct
+1Competition+ 2AID  Competition+ j + c + t + "ict (10)
where 2 > 0; since rms operating in a very competitive market are more likely to benet from the
benecial e¤ect of state aid.
All specication include time xed e¤ects. Statistical inference is corrected by clustering the error
terms on the 2 digit sector level, which consists of controlling for within-cluster error correlation.
Failure to control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to misleadingly small standard errors,
and consequently overestimation of the statistical signicance of the point estimates. We follow
Cameron and Miller (2013) to use bigger and more aggregate clusters up to the point of concern
about too few clusters. All cluster correlation of errors that is solely driven by common shocks are
accounted for by the xed e¤ects. As part of the robustness check and for the sake of completeness,
we also report the estimation results and corresponding standard errors clustered at the rm level in
the appendix.
3.3 Results
Our baseline results of equations (8) and (9) are reported in Table 4. In column (1), we look at the
relation between state aid and TFP growth, using a rm xed e¤ects framework. We don not nd
a statistical signicant relationship between state aid and productivity growth. However, the EC
rules of state aid have been relaxed with the nancial crisis and from Figure 1, we noted that the
number of state aid cases increased exponentially since 2007. In addition, we expect that rms will
experience more di¢ culty in nding funding to proceed their investment plans, which would allow for
state aid to be more e¤ective after the crisis than before. We therefore split our sample in a pre- and
post-crisis period for which the results are presented in columns (2) & (3). In the pre-crisis period, we
note that the e¤ect of state aid is not statistically di¤erent from zero. In contrast, during the crisis,
the e¤ect of state aid is positive and statistically signicant, conrming the hypothesis that state aid
was able to alleviate rms from their liquidity problem. Column (4) includes the initial distance to
the frontier as well as the interaction with state aid. As expected from the theoretical background,
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rms operating further from the technological frontier are catching up by growing faster in terms of
total factor productivity. In addition, laggard rms experience a more benecial e¤ect from state aid
measures. Columns (5) and (6) compare the 2 periods in our sample. We can note that in normal
economic times, laggards were catching up faster than they are able to during the crisis years. This
would indicate that they were more constraint during this second period and thereby state aid can
be more e¤ective, which is conrmed by the comparison of the coe¢ cients on the interaction term.
Before the crisis, there was overall no statistical signicant benet from state aid. The overall e¤ect
of state aid turns positive and statistically signicant during the crisis, where the negative sign on the
interaction term indicates that laggard rms innovate faster when they are supported by government
intervention.
Table 4: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.00810 -0.00182 0.0254* 0.00683* 0.00219 0.0178***
(0.00659) (0.00807) (0.0134) (0.00385) (0.00749) (0.00523)
distance -0.338*** -0.475*** -0.214***
(0.0310) (0.0467) (0.0249)
distance AID -0.105* -0.110 -0.161***
(0.0519) (0.104) (0.0451)
Constant 0.0475*** 0.0452*** -0.0676*** 0.129*** 0.139*** 0.0349***
(0.00476) (0.00283) (0.00900) (0.0131) (0.0261) (0.0109)
Observations 829,121 390,420 438,701 829,121 390,420 438,701
R-squared 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.015 0.012
Number of bvd_id 207,965 154,506 168,227
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time xed e¤ects; (ii) The reported standard errors are clustered
at the 2 digit sector level to control for within-sector correlation; (iii) Columns (1) - (3) include rm
xed e¤ects; (iv) Columns (4) - (6) include sector and country xed e¤ects.
To account for competitive pressure that rms within a sector experience, or alternatively the
degree of cash constraintness, we include Competition, measured as 1   Lerner. we also include
Competition interacted with state aid, or CompetitionAID, in the next set of regressions, for which
the results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) shows that competitive pressure has a positive e¤ect
on productivity growth, although its e¤ect is not statistically signicant at conventional levels (p value
of 0.14). However, during the crisis period, the direct impact of competition on productivity growth
increases and is statistically signicant at the one percent level. This is consistent with other work,
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which shows that competitive pressure and productivity growth is positively correlated (e.g. Nickell,
1995). Furthermore, we nd that the e¤ect of state aid is stronger in highly competitive sectors.
When a rm faces a more binding cash constraint, state aid induces statistically signicant higher
level of productivity growth. On average, the overall e¤ect of state aid, is as expected positive. When
a rm faces a very low degree of competition, state aid is unable to enhance TFP growth due to a
lack of a binding cash constraint and/or because it reduces the incentive to invest as a consequence of
a decline in the net gain from innovation. In normaleconomic times, the overall e¤ect of state aid
is not statistically signicant. When rms are more constraint due to the nancial crisis, the overall
e¤ect is always positive. Again, we nd a signicant di¤erent e¤ect of government intervention, given
the general economic circumstances in which state aid is provided, where the benecial e¤ect is mainly
driven by the post-crisis years.
Table 5: Competition and State Aid
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID -0.317* 0.207 -0.389*
(0.182) (0.328) (0.224)
distance -0.337*** -0.476*** -0.210***
(0.0318) (0.0469) (0.0281)
distance AID -0.116** -0.116 -0.185***
(0.0552) (0.104) (0.0467)
Competition 0.434 0.297 0.926***
(0.281) (0.269) (0.302)
Competition AID 0.355* -0.224 0.449*
(0.197) (0.358) (0.245)
Constant -0.283 -0.130 -0.853***
(0.269) (0.252) (0.291)
Observations 829,121 390,420 438,701
R-squared 0.017 0.015 0.013
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time,sector and country
xed e¤ects; (ii) The reported standard errors are clustered at
the 2 digit sector level to control for within-sector correlation;
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4 Robustness
In this section we conduct various robustness checks using alternative measures to dene whether or
not a rm is likely to have a binding cash constraint. Also productivity growth as well as distance-to-
frontier alternative measures are considered. In addition, we repeat the above specications leaving
out sectors with unusualTFP coe¢ cients, i.e. where either the labor or the capital coe¢ cient exceeds
one, as well as leaving out the individual cases. Finally, we provide some results from analyzing the
individual cases at the rm level.
4.1 Alternative measures for the cash constraint
In our baseline results, we used competition as a measure for the cash constraint. In this section,
we explore 5 alternative measures to dene whether or not state aid is able to enhance TFP growth
by allowing rms to proceed investment in otherwise rejected R&D projects, and/or to hasten the
process towards innovation. Table 6 reports the correlation between the various measures.
Table 6: Correlation between di¤erent measures for cash constraint
Competition ebitda dummy minsky jPEj
competition 1.0000
ebitda dummy 0.0727 1.000
minsky 0.0124 0.3876 1.0000
jPEj 0.0043 0.0286 -0.0246 1.0000
4.1.1 Robustness Check 1: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion
A rms earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization gives an idea whether or not a
rm is able to nance its operating activity by the earnings it receives from its products, and hence of
its protability. When EBITDA < 0; a rm earns negative prots, meaning it is completely unable
to nance any investment through current prots and is less likely to have su¢ cient cash available.
Table 7 provides the results for when we use a dummy variable, which equals 1 if EBITDA < 0;
From column(1), we can note that rms which have severe problems concerning their protability,
benet more from state aid measures. By comparing the pre- and post-crisis periods in columns (3)
and (4), we learn that this result holds before as well as after the crisis. The overall e¤ect of state aid
is positive, in particular for rms who are operating not to close to the technological frontier. This
result is mainly driven by the post-crisis years.
16
Table 7: Ebitda dummy as an alternative measure of cash constraint
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overall Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.00540 -0.235 0.210 -0.295
(0.00330) (0.163) (0.306) (0.205)
distance -0.293*** -0.291*** -0.415*** -0.178***
(0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0431) (0.0264)
distance AID -0.0963* -0.103* -0.103 -0.168***
(0.0476) (0.0507) (0.0948) (0.0431)
Competition 0.208 0.183 0.648**
(0.269) (0.251) (0.258)
Competition AID 0.263 -0.226 0.342
(0.177) (0.334) (0.224)
constraint 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.206*** 0.213***
(0.00974) (0.00948) (0.00673) (0.0139)
constraint AID 0.0323* 0.0314* 0.00593 0.0403*
(0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0142) (0.0226)
Constant 0.111*** -0.0873 -0.0526 -0.566**
(0.0138) (0.258) (0.237) (0.250)
Observations 828,970 828,970 390,400 438,570
R-squared 0.047 0.047 0.042 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time,sector and country xed e¤ects;
(ii) The reported standard errors are clustered at the 2 digit sector level
to control for within-sector correlation;
4.1.2 Robustness Check 2: Minskymeasure18
In stead of looking at the capability of a rm to internally nancing its investment plans, we now
consider to what extent a rm has access to external funding. The minskymeasure is dened as
minsky =
Interest paid
cash flow
and thereby denes to what extent rms are able to nance their current debt with their current cash
ow. The higher this value, the less likely a rm can count on nding external funding, which would
imply it being more cash constraint. Table 8 rapports the results, when we replace our competition
18Minsky, H. P., & Kaufman, H. (2008). Stabilizing an unstable economy (Vol. 1). New York: McGraw-Hill, denes
three stages of nancing: hedge, speculative and ponzi nancing, where in the latter case rms are not able to nance
the interest paid by their cash ow.
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measure with the minskydummy. The results are consistent with our previous ndings, except for
the interaction term minsky  AID which is not statistically signicant in either period, indicating
that state aid is not able to enhance productivity growth when rms are extremely cash constraint.
Table 8: Minsky measure as an alternative measure of the cash constraint
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overall Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.0133** -0.290 0.228 -0.345
(0.00591) (0.176) (0.322) (0.224)
distance -0.176*** -0.280*** -0.394*** -0.173***
(0.0216) (0.0248) (0.0388) (0.0241)
distance AID -0.142*** -0.0997* -0.101 -0.162***
(0.0444) (0.0529) (0.0922) (0.0461)
Competition 0.257 0.159 0.742**
(0.283) (0.252) (0.279)
Competition AID 0.322 -0.248 0.396
(0.190) (0.348) (0.242)
minsky 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.122***
(0.00800) (0.00589) (0.00549) (0.00771)
minsky AID 0.0109 0.00955 0.00399 0.0103
(0.00850) (0.00818) (0.0158) (0.00797)
Constant 0.00566 -0.155 -0.0503 -0.706**
(0.0113) (0.271) (0.239) (0.269)
Observations 437,512 826,918 389,406 437,512
R-squared 0.029 0.034 0.033 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time,sector and country xed e¤ects;
(ii) The reported standard errors are clustered at the rm-sector-country level.
4.1.3 Prot Elasticity
PE is an alternative measure of the intensity of competition and is dened as the percentage fall in
prots due to a percentage increase in (marginal) costs. The intuition is that ine¢ cient rms are
punished more harshly in terms of prots relative to more e¢ cient ones. Hence, when competition
increases, ine¢ cient rms will experience a bigger fall in prots as a result of the same percentage.
The PE accounts for increasing competition due to both a fall in entry costs (leading to more entry)
and more aggressive conduct by incumbent rms.
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Consider a benchmark rm at time t with prots, ; and marginal costs, ct19 . However, the relevant
values for rmsprots and marginal costs are not perfectly observed (e.g. a rm may produce other
products than those for the market under consideration). Following Boone et al.(2007), we denote the
observed prot level, dened as rms revenue minus variable costs, for rm i at time t by itui and
the observed marginal costs by citvi; measured by approximation by the average variable costs. By
assumption, these observation errors may di¤er between rms but are constant over time (or, if the
observational errors do change over time, they change in the same way for all rms in a sector such
that they are picked up by the time xed e¤ect)
The estimated equation is
ln

itui
t

=   t ln

citvi
ct

+ "it (11)
or equivalently
ln (it) = i + t    ln (cit) + "it (12)
where the rm xed e¤ect is given by i     ln (ui)   t ln (vi) and the time xed e¤ect is given
by t = ln (t) + t ln (ct) :Table 6 describes the summary statistics of the prot elasticity the results
for this regression. The coe¢ cient, , is a direct estimate of the absolute value of the prot elasticity.
Since the prot elasticity measures the competitive pressure within the market, and has the drawback
of being constant over time due to the estimation procedure, we include the constraint variable as
measure of the extent that rms are cash constraint. Table 9 reports the results, and we can conclude
that including the prot elasticity as additional measure of the competitive environment does not
alter previous conclusions.
19The benchmark rm could be the median or the least e¢ cient rm in the market.
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Table 9: Prot Elasticity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID -0.00338 -0.00321 -0.0135
(0.00779) (0.0118) (0.0178)
distance -0.293*** -0.415*** -0.183***
(0.0282) (0.0425) (0.0244)
distance AID -0.0991* -0.0987 -0.160***
(0.0487) (0.0978) (0.0391)
PE 0.000421 -0.00176 -0.00247
(0.00365) (0.00618) (0.00301)
PE AID 0.00434 0.00284 0.0136*
(0.00412) (0.00667) (0.00723)
constraint 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.214***
(0.00974) (0.00679) (0.0144)
constraint AID 0.0322* 0.00550 0.0408*
(0.0167) (0.0143) (0.0230)
Constant 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.0641***
(0.0203) (0.0329) (0.0137)
Observations 828,970 390,400 438,570
R-squared 0.047 0.041 0.046
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the rm-sector-country level
4.2 Labor productivity growth
Table 10 reports the results when using labor productivity growth, dened as the growth of added
value per employee, as outcome variable as an alternative measure of rm performance instead of
total factor productivity growth. To measure the extent to which laggardrms benet from state
aid measures, we dene distance-to-frontier in terms of labor productivity in a similar way as before,
namely
distance_li =
LPi
maxi2j;j2c(LPi)
Overall, most results remain valid. Laggardrms are able to catch up by growing faster and benet
more from state aid as they are more likely to experience liquidity constraints. Competitive pressure
ensures higher growth rates in terms of labor productivity. However, the negative e¤ect on the
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interaction term between competition and state aid has become insignicant.
Table 10: Labor productivity growth
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.206 0.260 -0.0410
(0.121) (0.198) (0.118)
distance_l -0.0355*** 0.0283*** -0.0857***
(0.00534) (0.00479) (0.00597)
distance_l AID -0.0431** 0.000383 -0.0483***
(0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0114)
Competition 0.324*** 0.229* 0.250***
(0.0850) (0.120) (0.0819)
Competition AID -0.222 -0.286 0.0520
(0.130) (0.215) (0.128)
Constant -0.294*** -0.174 -0.271***
(0.0787) (0.111) (0.0786)
Observations 829,345 390,517 438,828
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.018
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the sector level
4.3 Alternative measure for the Laggardrms
When the initial level of TFP is higher, the rm is more likely to be operating closer to the technological
frontier. When we replace our original distance to the frontier measure by the initial level of TFP, we
obtain the results reported in Table 11. Our results are conrmed.
21
Table 11: Initial TFP level using alternative clustering
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID -0.242*** 0.00138 -0.306***
(0.0417) (0.0701) (0.0575)
initialTFP -0.0758*** -0.0934*** -0.0575***
(0.00296) (0.00414) (0.00265)
initialTFP AID 0.00175 -0.000560 -0.00702**
(0.00324) (0.00466) (0.00318)
Competition 0.169*** 0.0334 0.611***
(0.0363) (0.0608) (0.0497)
Competition AID 0.267*** 7.77e-05 0.343***
(0.0455) (0.0767) (0.0628)
constraint 0.196*** 0.181*** 0.208***
(0.00290) (0.00428) (0.00394)
constraint AID 0.0317*** 0.00618 0.0370***
(0.00446) (0.00722) (0.00575)
Constant -0.139*** -0.0427 -0.591***
(0.0347) (0.0587) (0.0476)
Observations 828,970 390,400 438,570
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.054
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the rm-sector-country level
4.4 Schemes versus individual cases
In general, a distinction is made between schemes, i.e. state aid measures that apply to a sector or
region, and individual aid, i.e. state aid granted to a single rm, or a group of rms. The policy to
allow schemes to be implemented is more lenient than towards individual aid, because more dispersed
is commonly thought of to be less harmful to the economy. However, resources allocated in a scheme
are more scattered, which might be in conict with the goal of targeting aid more e¢ ciently. Tables
12 and 13 provide the results by considering the individual cases and the schemes separately.
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Table 12: Schemes
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
DISP -0.470** -0.306 -0.736*
(0.219) (0.266) (0.358)
distance -0.347*** -0.481*** -0.229***
(0.0409) (0.0525) (0.0392)
distance DISP -0.124* -0.142 -0.210***
(0.0697) (0.119) (0.0578)
Competition 0.462 0.201 1.616***
(0.277) (0.220) (0.376)
Competition DISP 0.519** 0.334 0.820**
(0.237) (0.286) (0.388)
Constant -0.308 -0.0507 -1.485***
(0.263) (0.207) (0.361)
0.017 0.015
Observations 828,757 390,243 438,514
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the sector level
Dispersed aid, under the form of schemes, is more benecial when granted to rms which can
be considered laggards. Furthermore, high competitive pressure within the sector, and therefore
less availability of resources from monopoly rents, induces aid measures to be more e¤ective in
terms of productivity growth. This e¤ect, however, is only statistically signicant in the post-crisis
years. When rms are not nancially constraint in pursuing productivity improvements, state aid is
unable to enhance the growth path, but private investments will simply get crowded out. In normal
economic times, rms are less likely to experience capital market restricitions, which explains why the
e¤ect of competitive pressure is not statistically signicant before the crisis starting in 2008. These
results are in line with the main results as reported in Table 5. For the individual cases, the results
concerning the cash constraint, expressed by the competitive pressure in the market remain valid.
However, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the distance-to-frontier measure and aid
becomes statistically insignicant in the post-crisis years, and negative before 2007. The benecial
e¤ect of state aid when granted to rms that operate further from the technological frontier, seems
to mainly driven by more dispersed aid.
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Table 13: Individual cases
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
IND -0.445*** 0.148 -0.708***
(0.158) (0.204) (0.140)
distance -0.320*** -0.407*** -0.233***
(0.0380) (0.0510) (0.0269)
distance  IND -0.0416 -0.0954* -0.0606
(0.0343) (0.0546) (0.0398)
Competition -0.00235 -0.0273 0.0406
(0.0494) (0.0845) (0.0639)
Competition  IND 0.489*** -0.152 0.770***
(0.172) (0.222) (0.153)
Constant 0.132*** 0.162** 0.0473
(0.0340) (0.0689) (0.0433)
Observations 828,757 390,243 438,514
R-squared 0.016 0.012 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the sector level
4.5 The e¤ect of state aid on rmsmarkups
Since the European Commission has a mission to stimulate the competitive environment within the
internal market, we might be concerned that competition might be an endogenous variable in our
above regressions. We check for this by regression rmsmarkups (or Lerner index) on our dummy of
state aid, distance-to-frontier measure, and the interaction term, since the rmsability to raise price
over marginal cost, gives a clear view in the self-nancing skill for investment of the rm. We nd
that close-to-frontierrms have higher markups, which is intuitively clear. State aid, however, does
not seem to e¤ect markups, leading us to believe that the potential endogeneity of competition is not
of great concern in our above obtained results.
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Table 14: The e¤ect of state aid on markups
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.00122 0.00275 0.000785
(0.00427) (0.00511) (0.00439)
distance 0.146*** 0.196*** 0.112***
(0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0194)
distance AID 0.0131 0.00479 0.0328
(0.0267) (0.0462) (0.0271)
Constant 0.0656*** 0.0648*** 0.0657***
(0.00270) (0.00293) (0.00286)
Observations 1,237,193 485,185 752,008
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the sector level
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5 Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between state aid and rmstotal factor productivity growth.
Overall, our results suggest that state aid is able to alleviate a binding cash constraint rms might
face when pursuing growth strategies, and thereby state aid positively a¤ects rm performance in
terms of productivity improvements. This e¤ect is mainly driven by the post-crisis years, when rms
were more likely to encounter di¢ culties in nding the necessary resources to follow their optimal
development path.
Increased competition induces higher levels of innovation, which is in line with results obtained in
earlier empirical studies on the relationship between product market competition and TFP growth.
These ndings state that rms in highly competitive sectors have a stronger incentive to restructure
and/or innovate. This positive e¤ect of competition is present before as well as after the crisis.
In addition, we nd a positive and signicant e¤ect from state aid in highly competitive markets,
indicating that state aid is able to accelerate the development pace of these rms. The catching up
process of laggardrms is conrmed and as expected, this investment behaviour is stimulated when
they are supported by a state aid measure. Our results remain valid throughout several robustness
checks.
Determining the optimal use of state aid measures in pursuit of sustainable growth by focusing on
the underlying industry dynamics specic to an internal market, both theoretical and empirical, can
provide a deeper insight of the results obtained in this paper. Both the duration and the intensity
of state aid, as well as the extent to which government resources are dispersed, can be important
components to obtain "the least and best targeted aid". Besides obtaining convergence within the
internal market and staying a prosperous continent, employment is also at the heart of the European
objectives. Identifying the e¤ectiveness of state aid on maintaining/increasing employment rates as
well as a potential trade-o¤ between the di¤erent goals set out by the Lisbon Strategy, provide an
interesting eld of future research.
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Appendix A: NACE Rev.2: Manufacturing
Code Description
10 Food products
11 Beverages
12 Tobacco products
13 Textiles
14 Wearing Apparel
15 Leather and related products
16 Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; art. of straw and plaiting materials
17 Paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Coke and rened petroleum products
20 Chemicals and chemical products
21 Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Rubber and plastic products
23 Other non-metallic mineral products
24 Basic metals
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Computer, electronic and optical products
27 Electrical equipment
28 Machinery and equipment
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Other transport equipment
31 Furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
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Appendix B: Number of observations by country
Country Number of observations
Austria 2860
Belgium 11192
Finland 27864
France 206753
Germany 28349
Italy 414944
Luxembourg 208
Netherlands 316
Portugal 105901
Spain 414574
Sweden 25499
Appendix C: Alternative clustering
We reestimate tables (4) - (6) using an alternative clustervariable. The results obtained are reported
in tables (4) - (6). As expected, the signicance of the coe¢ cients is augmented by clustering on
a lower level. Table (9) reports our baseline results. The relationship between state aid and TFP
growth is overall positive and statistically signicant. This result is however completely driven by the
crisis years.
Table 4: Baseline Results using alternative clustering
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID 0.00810*** -0.00182 0.0254***
(0.00182) (0.00350) (0.00405)
Constant 0.0475*** 0.0452*** -0.0676***
(0.00128) (0.00148) (0.00257)
Observations 829,121 390,420 438,701
R-squared 0.014 0.002 0.006
Number of rms 207,965 154,506 168,227
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the rm-sector-country level
Table (5) conrms the results obtained in table (5). Laggard rms experience higher growth rates
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and are thereby involved in a catching up process which accelerated under state aid. Competitive
pressure is growth enhancing, before as well as after the crisis. State aid is capable of enhancing
growth in highly competitive sectors when the cash constraint is more binding, i.e. after the crisis.
Table 10 Competition and State Aid using alternative clustering
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID -0.317*** 0.207*** -0.389***
(0.0420) (0.0729) (0.0576)
distance -0.337*** -0.476*** -0.210***
(0.00731) (0.0121) (0.00898)
distance AID -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.185***
(0.0138) (0.0238) (0.0174)
Competition 0.434*** 0.297*** 0.926***
(0.0357) (0.0613) (0.0497)
Competition AID 0.355*** -0.224*** 0.449***
(0.0459) (0.0797) (0.0629)
Constant -0.283*** -0.130** -0.853***
(0.0342) (0.0595) (0.0476)
Observations 829,121 390,420 438,701
R-squared 0.017 0.015 0.013
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the rm-sector-country level
The results of table (6) correspond to table (6). All conclusions remain valid.
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Table 6: Ebitda dummy using alternative clustering
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Overall Before crisis After crisis
AID -0.235*** 0.210*** -0.295***
(0.0425) (0.0725) (0.0578)
distance -0.291*** -0.415*** -0.178***
(0.00737) (0.0121) (0.00917)
distance AID -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.168***
(0.0138) (0.0237) (0.0175)
Competition 0.208*** 0.183*** 0.648***
(0.0361) (0.0611) (0.0497)
Competition AID 0.263*** -0.226*** 0.342***
(0.0464) (0.0793) (0.0631)
constraint 0.209*** 0.206*** 0.213***
(0.00287) (0.00417) (0.00396)
constraint AID 0.0314*** 0.00593 0.0403***
(0.00445) (0.00727) (0.00577)
Constant -0.0873** -0.0526 -0.566***
(0.0345) (0.0593) (0.0476)
Observations 828,970 390,400 438,570
R-squared 0.047 0.042 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: (i) All specications include time, sector and country xed
e¤ects; (ii) SEs are clustered at the rm-sector-country level
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